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1. INTRODUCTION 
1. In 2009, Johan ERAUW, who has been a colleague of mine at Ghent University for several 
years1, commented on the rule of private international law relating to contracts of carriage of 
passengers, which is incorporated in article 5.2 of the Rome I-Regulation. Johan particularly 
argued that (own translation): 
“Although the European legislator aimed to protect consumers adequately, it did not reach 
this objective. More specifically, this is due to the fact that the contractual parties are given 
the possibility to agree that the contract is governed by the law of the country where the 
carrier has his habitual residence or his place of central administration. Since choice of law 
clauses are included in the general terms and conditions and since passengers do not have the 
possibility to negotiate the content of these terms, in reality the carrier has the possibility to 
determine that his own law is applicable to the contract. Therefore, passengers aren’t 
protected at all.” 2. 
2. In this article, I will focus on contracts of carriage of airline passengers. More specifically, 
I will address two questions. On the one hand, I will discuss to what extent consumers 
concluding an airline’s contract of carriage are less protected than “ordinary” consumers in 
the field of private international law. On the other hand, I will indicate to what extent this lack 
of protection really matters, taking into account the harmonization that has taken place with 
regard to airline’s contracts of carriage within the European Union and at the international 
level. Prior to addressing these two questions, it is, however, necessary to discuss very briefly 
article 5.2 of the Rome I-Regulation relating to contracts of carriage of passengers and its 
relation to international Conventions containing uniform rules on contracts of carriage.  
 
2. RULES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH REGARD TO CARRIAGE 
CONTRACTS  
3. Article 5 Rome I makes a distinction between contracts of carriage of goods and contracts 
of carriage of passengers. In the case of an airline’s contract of carriage, the carriage contract 
relates to passengers as well as their baggage. However, the carriage of baggage being 
complementary to the carriage of passengers - i.e. not being the main purpose of the contract - 
rules relating to the carriage of passengers must be applied to airline’s contracts of carriage.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In 2002, I had the pleasure of publishing an article together with Johan: J. ERAUW & R. STEENNOT, “Actualia 
inzake internationaal privaatrecht bij grensoverschrijdende overeenkomsten” (2002), in Privaatrecht in de reële 
en virtuele wereld. XXVIIste Postuniversitaire Cyclus Willy Delva, Antwerpen, Kluwer, pp. 781-840. 
2 J. DE MEYER & J. ERAUW, “Het recht van toepassing op verbintenissen uit overeenkomst volgens de nieuwe 
Rome I-Verordening” (2009), in Nieuw Internationaal Privaatrecht: meer Europees, meer globaal. XXXVste 
Postuniversitaire Cyclus Willy Delva, Mechelen, Kluwer, p. 318, nr. 72. This article is the written report of an 
oral presentation, which Johan held in Ghent, as well as in Antwerp. I vividly recall we drove to Antwerp 
together, having a pleasant and interesting discussion, amongst others on private international law and consumer 
protection. 
In case of a contract for the carriage of passengers, the parties can choose the law applicable 
to the contract for the carriage. However, the choice is “restricted” to the law of the country 
where: (a) the passenger has his habitual residence; or (b) the carrier has his habitual 
residence; or (c) the carrier has his place of central administration; or (d) the place of 
departure is situated; or (e) the place of destination is situated. As one can see, one can hardly 
speak of a actual limitation of the possibility to choose the applicable law, since the carrier has 
the possibility to choose for the law of the country where he has his habitual residence or his 
place of central administration (art. 5.2 Rome I)3. In reality, the general terms and conditions 
contain such a choice of law clause, implying that passengers adhering to the general terms 
and conditions will not be able to invoke the law of the country in which they reside4. 
 
If the parties did not choose the law applicable to the contract (which is uncommon), the law 
of the country where the passenger has his habitual residence applies, insofar either the place 
of departure or the place of destination is situated in the country where the passenger has his 
habitual residence. If these requirements are not met - i.e. when the passenger has his 
residence in another country than the place of departure or the place of destination - once 
again the law of the country where the carrier has his habitual residence applies (art. 5.2 Rome 
I). Only where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the contract is manifestly 
more closely connected with another country than that indicated in art. 5.2 Rome I, the law of 
that other country applies (art. 5.3 Rome I). 
 
4. In the context of international carriage contracts it is important to emphasize that the Rome 
I Regulation does not prejudice the application of international conventions (art.25 Rome I), 
such as those seeking to regulate carriage by a particular mode of transport by imposing a 
uniform set of rules5. With regard to the international carriage of passengers and their baggage 
by air, one needs to take into account the Montreal Convention6, which determines in article 
46 that any clause contained in the contract of carriage by which the parties purport to infringe 
the rules laid down by the Convention, whether by deciding the law to be applied, or by 
altering the rules as to jurisdiction, are to be considered null and void. It is clear that the 
Convention, being directly applicable7, does not leave any room for the application of other 
rules, where a Convention provision is applicable8.  
 
More specifically, amongst others provisions, the Montreal Convention contains rules on:  
• the liability of the carrier in the event of 1) death or injury of passengers, 2) loss or 
destruction of or damages to baggage and 3) delay in the carriage of passengers or 
baggage (articles 17 and 19)  
• the compensation to be paid in case of liability for death or injury of passengers (art. 
21) and  
• the limitation of liability in case of delay in the carriage of passengers or loss, 
destruction of or damages to baggage (art. 22). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 D. MARTINY, Münchner Commentar Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch. München, Verlag C.H. Beck 2010, pp. 648; 
P.A. NIELSEN, “The Rome I Regulation and contracts of carriage”, in Rome I Regulation, The Law Applicable to 
Contractual Obligations in Europe, Sellier, Munich 2009, pp. 107. 
4 J. DE MEYER & J. ERAUW, ibidem note nr. 2, p. 318, nr. 72; H. KENFACK, “Le règlement (CE) n° 593/2008 du 
17 juin 2008 sur la loi applicable aux obligations contractuelles (“Rome I”), navire stable aux instruments 
efficaces de navigation?” (2009) 136 JDI ( Journal du Droit International), nr. 34. 
5 DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS, The Conflict of Laws, London. Sweet & Maxwell 2012, pp. 1921. 
6 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, 194 OJL 18 July 2001, p. 39. 
7 See also: J. ERAUW & H. STORME, Internationaal Privaatrecht, in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht, 
Kluwer, Mechelen 2009, pp. 794.  
8 DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS, ibidem, note nr. 5, pp. 1923. 
 
Contrary to the European Regulation No 261/20049 (Airline Passengers Regulation), which 
contains a uniform set of rules with regard to airline’s passengers rights in the case of denied 
boarding, cancellation or delay, the Montreal Convention does not contain any provisions on 
liability in the event of denied boarding and cancellation of a flight10. 
 
 
3. RULES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH REGARD TO CONSUMER 
CONTRACTS 
 
5. In order to determine whether airline passengers are less protected than consumers in 
general at the level of private international law, it is necessary to take a closer look at article 6 
Rome I that contains a specific rule of private international law for consumer contracts. As 
will be illustrated below, article 6.2 Rome I offers additional protection to consumers insofar 
certain conditions are met.  
 
In the following sections, I will indicate the content of the protection offered to consumers, 
the conditions which must be met in order to apply this specific protection and finally the 
extent to which this specific protection is applicable to airline passengers qualifying as a 
consumer. 
 
3.1. THE ACTUAL PROTECTION 
 
6. Article 6.2 Rome I determines that in the absence of a choice of law clause, a consumer 
contract is governed by the law of the country where the consumer has his habitual residence. 
In the case the parties have chosen to apply another law (most often the law of the country 
where the professional is established), this choice of law can not deprive the consumer from 
the protection which is offered to him by the “mandatory” provisions – i. e. provisions that 
can not be derogated from by agreement - incorporated in the law of the country where the 
consumer has his habitual residence. It is clear that most rules, which aim to protect 
consumers, are mandatory within the meaning of this provision11. 
 
Therefore, the consumer will find himself in an favorable position in case the professional has 
chosen to apply the law of the country where the professional is established. If the 
professional’s law offers additional protection compared to the consumer’s law, the consumer 
can invoke the provisions incorporated in the professional’s law, since this law has been 
chosen. If the law of the consumer’s country offers additional protection, the consumer will be 
able to apply his own law. He gets the best out of two worlds. Therefore, this rule is definitely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance 
to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing 
Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJL 46, 17 February 2004, p. 1). The European Commission has proposed some 
changes to the existing Regulation. The proposal clarifies legal grey areas and introduces new rights where 
necessary. See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-203_en.htm. 
10 This paper will not focus on the relation between the Montreal Convention and the European Regulation, in 
particular in the event of a delayed flight. Reference is only made to the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of 
the EU entitling the passenger to a compensation in the event a flight reaches its final destination more than three 
hours late (insofar delay is not due to unforeseeable circumstances): Case C-402/07, Sturgeon Christopher 
Sturgeon, Gabriel Sturgeon and Alana Sturgeon v Condor Flugdienst GmbH, and Case C-432/07, Stefan Böck 
and Cornelia Lepuschitz v Air France SA [2009] ECR- I, 10923; Case C-581/10, Nelson v Deutsche Lufthansa 
AG and Case C-629/10, TUI Travel v Civil Aviation Authority, not yet published in ECR. See also Case C-
413/11, Germanwings v. Thomas Amend, not yet published in ECR. 
11 D. MARTINY, ibidem note nr. 3, pp. 709-710. 
more beneficial than a rule which would simply state that in all cases falling under the scope 
of article 6 Rome I, the consumer’s law must be applied12. 
 
It is clear that article 6.2 Rome I is far more beneficial than the rule governing contracts of 
carriage of passengers (art. 5.2), which in the event of a choice for the professional’s law does 
not enable a passenger to invoke additional protection that is offered to him by the mandatory 
provisions of the country where he has his habitual residence. Only to the extent that certain 
provisions can also be considered overriding mandatory in the meaning of article 9.1 Rome 
I13, the passenger might be able to invoke the additional protection incorporated in his own 
law (see art. 9 Rome I). In my view, next to provisions relating to passenger’s security, the 
rules incorporated in the Airline Passengers Regulation can be considered as overriding 
mandatory. Once they apply according to the Regulation (infra nr. 14), passengers can invoke 
these rules independent of the choice of law made.  
 
3.2. REQUIREMENTS WHICH MUST BE MET TO APLLY ARTICLE 6.2 ROME I 
 
7. It is important to emphasize that this specific rule of private international law can only 
apply if certain conditions are met. First, the contract must be concluded by a natural person 
for a purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade or profession (the consumer) 
with another person acting in the exercise of his trade or profession (the professional). 
Secondly, the professional must pursue his commercial or professional activities in the 
country where the consumer has his habitual residence, or by any means, direct such activities 
to that country or to several countries including that country, and the contract must fall within 
the scope of such activities (art. 6.1 Rome I)14. 
 
8. In the past, the Court of Justice has interpreted the notion of a consumer in a narrow way. 
In the Gruber-case15, the Court stated that a person who concludes a contract for goods 
intended for purposes which are in part within and in part outside his trade or profession may 
not rely on the special rules, unless the trade or professional purpose is so limited as to be 
negligible in the overall context of the supply, the fact that the private element is predominant 
being irrelevant in that respect. Therefore, a business man travelling abroad and combining 
business and pleasure would never be able to invoke the protection offered by article 6 Rome 
I16. 
 
9. A professional pursues his activities within the consumer’s country if he (or his 
representative) has actually travelled to the country where the consumer resides or when he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 A. LOPEZ-TARRUELLA MARTINEZ, “International consumer contracts in the new Rome I Regulation: how 
much does the regulation change?” (2008) 12 EJCL (European Journal of Consumer Law) pp. 361. See also: J. 
BASEDOW, “Consumer contracts and insurance contracts in a future Rome I-Regulation”, in Enforcement of 
International Contracts in the European Union: Convergence and Divergence between Brussels I and Rome I, 
Antwerp 2004, pp.281-280; D. MARTINY, ibidem note nr. 3, pp. 710. 
13 Overriding mandatory provisions are provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for 
safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or economic organization, to such an extent that they 
are applicable to any situation falling within their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the 
contract under this Regulation (art. 9.1 Rome I). See for example: J. HARRIS, “Mandatory Rules and Public 
Policy under the Rome I Regulation”, in Rome I Regulation, The Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations in 
Europe, Sellier, Munich 2009, pp. 269-342; D. MARTINY, ibidem note nr. 3, pp. 803-808. 
14 A. BELOHLAVEK, Rome Convention Rome I regulation. Juris, 2010, pp. 1145-1146; A. LOPEZ-TARRUELLA 
MARTINEZ, ibidem note nr. 12, pp. 354.  
15 Case C-464/01, Johann Gruber v. Bay Wa AG, [2005] ECR-I, 439, para. 46. See for example: G. HOWELLS, 
“The scope of European consumer law”, (2005) 1 ERCL (European Review of Contract Law), pp. 360-361. 
16 H. KENFACK, ibidem note nr. 3, nr. 45. 
opens a temporary or permanent establishment in that state. However, the specific rule of 
private international law only applies when the contract falls within the scope of this 
activity17. This will for instance not be the case if a German professional has a branch in 
Belgium, but the Belgian consumer concludes the contract at a German branch. 
 
10. If not pursuing any activities in the consumer’s country, the consumer will still be able to 
invoke the protection offered by article 6.2 Rome if the professional has directed its activities 
to the consumer’s country. First, it is important to emphasize that the scope of application of 
this provision is not limited to contracts which are concluded at a distance18. Also, it is 
irrelevant by which means the professional directs its activities to the consumer’s country. For 
example, a professional clearly directs its activities to the consumer’s country when he 
advertises in the local newspapers of the consumer’s country or on the radio or television 
channels of the consumer’s country19. Recently, the Court of Justice acknowledged that in 
order to apply the specific rule of private international law, it is not necessary that the 
consumer can prove the existence of a causal link between the means used to direct the 
commercial activity to the consumer’s country and the conclusion of the contract20.	  
 
In this context the question arises when a professional directs its commercial activities to the 
consumer’s country when he offers goods and services over the Internet. In this context the 
joined Pammer/Alpenhof-cases21 are particularly interesting22. In these cases, the Court of 
Justice of the EU decided that in order to determine whether a professional whose activity is 
presented on its website (or on that of an intermediary) can be considered to be ‘directing’ its 
activity to the Member State of the consumer’s domicile, it must be ascertained whether, 
before the conclusion of any contract with the consumer, it is apparent from those websites 
and the professional’s overall activity that the professional was envisaging doing business 
with consumers domiciled in one or more Member States, including the Member State of that 
consumer’s domicile, in the sense that it was intended to conclude a contract with them.  
 
Such intention to conclude contracts with consumers from other Member States can not only 
be derived from an explicit statement on the professional’s website, but also from certain 
indications. More specifically, the following indications - the list is not exhaustive - may 
constitute evidence supporting the conclusion that the professional’s activity is directed to the 
Member State of the consumer’s domicile: the international nature of the activity, use of a 
language or a currency other than the language or currency generally used in the Member 
State in which the professional is established with the possibility of making and confirming 
the reservation in that other language, mention of telephone numbers with an international 
code, outlay of expenditure on an internet referencing service in order to facilitate access to 
the trader’s site or that of its intermediary by consumers domiciled in other Member States, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS, ibidem, note nr. 5, pp. 1953; A. LOPEZ-TARRUELLA MARTINEZ, ibidem note nr. 
12, pp. 354. 
18 Case C-190/11, Daniela Mühlleitner v. Ahmad Yusufi and Wadat Yusufi, [2012], not yet published in ECR, 
para 42; A. STAUDINGER & B. STEINRÖTTER, “Kein Erfordernis eines Fernabsatzvertrags bei 
Verbrauchergerichtsstand”, (2012) NJW (Neue Juristische Wochenschrift), pp.3227. 
19 A. LOPEZ-TARRUELLA MARTINEZ, ibidem note nr. 12, pp. 354. 
20 Case C-218/11, Lokman Emrek v. Vlado Sabranovic, [2013], not yet published in ECR, para 25. 
21 Joined cases C-585/08, Peter Pammer v. Reederei Karl Schlüter GmbH & Co. KG and C-144/09, Hotel 
Alpenhof GesmbH v. Oliver Heller, [2010] ECR I-12527, para. 75-84. 
22 See also : E. ALVAREZ ARMAS & M. DECHAMPS, “Arrêt Pammer et Hotel Alpenhof: L'équilibre entre 
consommateurs et professionnels dans l'e-commerce” (2011) 15 EJCL, pp. 447-453 ; M. POSNOW WURM, “La 
protection des consommateurs en droit international privé européen suite aux arrest Pammer – Hotel Alpenhof: la 
notion d’ “activité dirigée””, 2011 Tijdschrift@IPR.be, pp. 162-180. 
use of a top-level domain name other than that of the Member State in which the professional 
is established, and mention of an international clientele composed of customers domiciled in 
various Member States. On the other hand, the mere accessibility of the professional’s or the 
intermediary’s website in the Member State in which the consumer is domiciled is 
insufficient. The same is true for the mere mentioning of an email address and of other contact 
details, or the use of a language or a currency that is the language and/or currency generally 
used in the Member State in which the trader is established. 
 
Although it is for the national courts to decide whether the professional has directed its 
activities to the consumer’s country, it is clear that - if this rule would apply to airline’s 
contracts of carriage (infra nr. 12) - there would be many cases where consumers booking 
their flight online would be able to invoke their own law. More specifically, this would for 
example be the case when prices are indicated on the airline’s website in the currency of the 
consumer’s country (not being the currency of the airline’s country) (e.g. British Airways also 
indicating its prices in euro), the airline’s website uses the language of the consumer’s 
country, not being the language of the airline’s country (e.g. the webpage of 
www.airfrance.be is in Dutch), advertises the possibility to depart from an airport within the 
consumer’s country (e.g. Lufthansa enabling consumers to depart from Brussels) or explains 
on its website how consumers from another country can reach the airport of the airline’s 
country (e.g. KLM mentioning on his website how to drive from Antwerp, Ghent and 
Brussels (Belgian cities) to Schiphol airport (located at Amsterdam in the Netherlands).  
 
Finally, it is important to stress, that a consumer can of course not invoke this specific rule of 
private international law if the professional has clearly indicated on his website that he does 
not wish to conclude contracts with consumers from a given country23. However, this is rather 
uncommon in the context of airline’s contracts of carriage. 
 
11. In conclusion, if the specific rule of private international law would apply to airline’s 
contracts of carriage, there would be many situations in which a passenger, that can be 
considered a consumer, would be able to invoke this specific rule of private international law. 
But, as we will illustrate immediately, airline’s contracts of carriage are often excluded from 
the specific rule of private international law for consumer contracts. 
 
3.3. APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE 6.2 ROME I TO AIRLINE’S CONTRACTS OF 
CARRIAGE 
 
12. The specific rule of private international law protecting consumers does not apply to 
carriage contracts (art. 6.4 Rome I)24. Therefore, a consumer booking an airline ticket will be 
less protected than a consumer concluding another cross-border contract with a professional 
who has pursued or directed his activities to or in the consumer’s country25.   
 
However, not all contracts relating to the carriage of passengers are excluded from the scope 
of article 6 Rome I. A distinction must be made whether the transport forms a part of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Opinion of Advocate General TRSTENJAK, Joined cases C-585/08 and C-144/09, para 92 
24 F. GARCIMARTIN ALFAREZ, “The Rome I Regulation: Exceptions to the Rule on Consumer Contracts and 
Financial Instruments”, (2009) 5 JPIL (Journal of Private International Law), pp. 87. 
25 P.A. NIELSEN, ibidem note nr. 3, pp. 107; D. MARTINY, ibidem  note nr. 3, pp. 643. Also excluded from the 
specific rule of private international law are contracts for the supply of services where the services are to be 
supplied to the consumer exclusively in a country other than that in which the consumer has his habitual 
residence (6.4 a) Rome I). 
package in the meaning of the Package Tours Directive26. If so, the specific rule of private 
international law for consumer contracts can apply (insofar the other requirements, mentioned 
earlier  are met, supra nrs. 8-10)27; if not, it falls under the exclusion of carriage contracts. 
Therefore, it is important to determine what a “package” actually means. Article 2.1 of the 
Package Tour Directive defines the concept as the pre-arranged combination of not fewer than 
two of the following services: transport, accommodation and other tourist services not 
ancillary to transport or accommodation and accounting for a significant proportion of the 
package. Further, a package requires that these services are sold or offered for sale at an 
inclusive price and that the services cover a period of more than twenty-four hours or include 
overnight accommodation28. 
 
It is clear that a consumer booking an airline ticket online at the airline company’s website or 
through an intermediary’s site such as www.cheaptickets.com and booking his 
accommodation directly at the hotel’s website or through an accommodation provider such as 
booking.com, will not be able to invoke the specific protection of article 6.2 Rome I. On the 
contrary, a consumer booking a flight and hotel accommodation at an inclusive price through 
the website of a traditional tour operator will be protected (insofar the specific application 
criteria of article 6.1 Rome I are met).  
 
With regard to situations where the accommodation and the transport are integrated in one 
deal, the Court of Justice argued in the Pammer-case29, that a contract concerning a voyage by 
freighter, is a contract of transport that, for an inclusive price, provides for a combination of 
travel and accommodation. Therefore, it must be considered as a package as defined in the 
Package Tours Directive. However, a service mainly consisting of transport and only 
providing accommodation in order to increase the passenger’s comfort (e.g. an overnight 
flight or hotel accommodation in the case of a cancellation of a flight), cannot be regarded as 
a package and therefore falls under the scope of the exclusion of art. 6.4 b) Rome I30.  
 
An interesting question relates to the fact that many airline companies, on their websites or 
after booking an airline ticket, “offer” accommodation at certain hotels. In this context it must 
be examined whether, in case the passenger also books accommodation, a package deal is 
concluded. Most often, this will not be the case since the airline company will not commit 
itself to provide the accommodation. The airline company merely provides information by 
including a hyperlink to certain hotels at their website. If the consumer, after clicking on this 
link, makes a reservation, a contract is concluded directly between the hotel owner and the 
consumer31. Therefore, only if the airline company commits itself to provide accommodation 
- which is moreover not complementary to the flight operated (e.g. accommodation for the 
night between connecting flights) -  and this in addition to the carriage of the passenger by air 
and at an inclusive price, a package deal comes into play.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Council Directive 90/314/EEC of 13 June 1990 on package travel, package holidays and package tours, 158 
OJL 23 June 1990, p.59.  
27 P.A. NIELSEN, ibidem note nr. 3, pp. 108; D. MARTINY, ibidem note nr. 3, pp. 648. 
28 On 9 July 2013 the Commission proposed a reform of the Package Travel Directive to bring it up to date with 
the developments in the travel market. While still focusing on ‘packages’, it is wider in scope and clearly 
includes new, commonly used combined travel arrangements. 
29 Case C-585/08, Peter Pammer v. Reederei Karl Schlüter GmbH & Co. KG [2010] ECR I-12527, para. 45. 
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31 President Commercial Court Namur, 10 March 2010, (2011) 92-93 DCCR (Droit de la Consommation – 
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13. In conclusion, airline’s passengers, which can be considered a consumer, will not be able 
to invoke the specific protection at the level of private international law, when merely 
booking a flight and are therefore at the level of private international law less protected than 
“ordinary” consumers. However, when the flight is a part of a package and the tour operator 
has pursued its activities within the consumer’s country or has directed its activities towards 
the consumer’s country, the consumer will be protected at the level of private international 
law. 
 
 
4.	  TO	  WHAT	  EXTENT	  DOES	  PRIVATE	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	  REALLY	  MATTER	  ?	  
	  
14. Do rules of private international law really matter, taking into account the European 
Airline Passengers Regulation and the Montreal Convention? Being directly applicable within 
the national law of the Member States, the rules on denied boarding, cancellation and delay of 
flights (Regulation) and the rules on liability in case of death or injury or loss of destruction of 
baggage are identical in all Member States. Moreover, the Court of Justice of EU is competent 
to interpret the rules incorporated in the Regulation and the Montreal Convention.  
 
First of all, it is important to emphasize in this context that important questions with regard to 
passenger’s rights, such as liability of the airline company in event of denied boarding and in 
case of cancellation are not dealt with in the Montreal Convention. In addition, not all flights 
booked by European consumers fall within the scope of the Airline Passengers Regulation. 
More specifically, the Regulation applies to 1) flights departing in a Member State of the 
European Union and 2) flights departing outside the European Union to an airport situated in 
the territory of a Member State, insofar the operating air carrier of the flight concerned is a 
Community carrier32. Therefore, the Regulation for example does not apply in case of 
cancellation of a flight from Cape Town to Brussels operated by South African Airlines. This 
contract will normally include a choice for South African law (see art. 5.2 Rome I), which 
might offer less protection than the law of the European country where the consumer 
resides33.  
 
15. Furthermore, talking about passenger’s rights, other consumer protection Directives are 
also important. Especially, the Directive on unfair contract terms34, prohibiting unfair contract 
clauses in contracts with consumers, plays an important role. This Directive is based on 
minimum harmonization, which implies that Member States, when implementing the 
Directive, retained the possibility to maintain and even introduce measures which offer 
additional protection to consumers35, the only requirement being that additional protection 
measures do not violate the principle on the free movement of goods, or in our case services36. 
Therefore, in case of minimum harmonization, rules of private international law remain 
important whenever the legislator of the consumers’ country has chosen to maintain or 
introduce additional protection measures. Research has shown that with regard to unfair 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 ‘Community carrier’ means an air carrier with a valid operating license granted by a Member State in 
accordance with the provisions of Council Regulation 92/2407/EEC of 23.07.1992 on licensing of air carriers 
(Art 2(c)). 
33 Taking into account the auto-limitative character of the Regulation, the protection incorporated in the 
Regulation can not apply, not even if the law of the consumer’s country would be applicable to the contract. 
34 Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, 95 OJL 21 April 1993, p. 29 
35 V. MAK, “Review of the Consumer Acquis: Towards Full Harmonization?”, (2009) 17 ERPL (European 
Review of Private Law), pp. 58-59; C. TWIGG-FLESNER, “No sense of purpose or direction? The modernization 
of European Consumer Law”, 2007 3 ERCL (European Review of Contract Law), pp. 204. 
36 Case C-205/07, Lodewijk Gysbrechts and Santurel Inter BVBA, [2008] ECR I-09947, para 34. 
contract clauses, many Member States have used the possibility to incorporate additional 
protection measures, implying that the law of the consumer’s country might offer more 
protection against unfair contract terms than the law of the carrier’s central admininistration. 
 
However, Directives can also be based on full harmonization. Directives based on full 
harmonization do not only determine the minimum level of protection which must be offered 
to consumers, but also the maximum level of protection that can be offered (at least within the 
field harmonized by the Directive)37. Therefore, in the case of full harmonization, the 
importance of rules of private international law is limited to questions not falling under the 
scope of the Directive or questions not being harmonized by the Directive38. Interesting to 
mention in this context is that the Consumer Rights Directive39 does not apply to 1) package 
contracts in the meaning of the Package Tour Directive and 2) contracts for passenger 
transport services40 (art. 3.3). Once again, private international law remains important, since 
differences between the law of the Member States can remain. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
16. This paper has shown that passengers who merely book a flight are far less protected at 
the level of private international law than ordinary consumers, who can - at least if the 
professional has pursued his activities in or directed his activities to the consumer’s country - 
invoke additional protection measures that are incorporated in the law of the country where 
they reside. Only if the flight is part of a package in the meaning of the Package Tour 
Directive, passengers will at the level of private international law be protected in the same 
way as other consumers. 
 
As far as passengers’ rights in the event of cancellation, delay or denied boarding (Airline 
Passengers Regulation) or in the event of death or injury of passenger or loss or destruction of 
baggage (Montreal Convention), are concerned, it is important to understand that due to the 
harmonization of air passenger’s rights in most cases identical rules apply if consumers 
residing in the EU book a flight. However, it is equally important to understand that the rules 
incorporated in the Airline Passengers Regulation are not always applicable, since the 
Regulation does not apply to flights departing outside the European Union to an airport 
situated in the territory of a Member State, if the operating air carrier of the flight concerned 
is not a Community carrier. Furthermore, with regard to the unfairness of contractual terms, 
significant differences remain between the law of the Member States due the fact that the 
Unfair Contract Terms Directive is based on minimum harmonization41. The lack of 
protection at the level of private international law with regard to airline’s contracts of carriage 
can therefore still be criticized.  
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